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GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS TO SOVIET MARITIME POWER
INTRODUCTION
Despite Soviet military expansion on land immediately
following World War II, maritime strategy remained defensive in
nature and the four Soviet Fleets operated largely in the vicinity of
their own bases. However, as the "Cold War" progressed, the Soviet
Navy continued to expand rapidly to respond to the need to maintain,
support and expand overseas influence in the wake of decolonization
by the Western Powers. This led to the realization that the Soviet
Fleet urgently needed the ability to leave their traditional bastions
to gain unimpeded access to the oceans of the world.
To support this newly developed requirement, effort was
devoted to the construction of ships, submarines and naval aircraft
with long range capabilities. Overseas bases were developed in
friendly countries to provide infrastructure for distant operations.
The Cuban Crisis of 1962 was a severe setback to the growing
invincibility of the Soviet Navy, but led to a redoubling of effort to
ensure that in the future it would be capable of projecting power at
will. But throughout that period, the expanding Navy was vulnerable
and remains so today. That vulnerability is created by geographical
constraints which inhibit the four Soviet Fleets from free access to
the major oceans (see orientation maps at end).
It is possible that the recent changes in Soviet attitudes and
the introduction of "perestroika" by Mikhail Gorbachev, may result in
a reduction of Soviet Maritime Power. But there is little evidence of
reduction of the priority given the military budget allocations and at
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present the Soviet Union's position as a superpower is very
dependent upon military strength. It would require a major change
in policy at the highest level to adopt a strategy whereby Soviet
Maritime Power becomes less dependent upon free access to the
oceans. However, there are indications that alternatives to that
dependence are being considered.
The aim of this paper is to identify the geographical
constraints, assess their impact and explore alternatives that may
be considered to reduce their detrimental effects upon Soviet
Maritime Power.
The paper will provide a background by addressing the recent
history, status and current missions of the Soviet Navy, which is the
vehicle for maritime power. The nature of the geographical
constraints will then be discussed before assessing individually the
impacts on the four Soviet Fleets: Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and
Pacific. Finally some alternatives will be explored to counter the
vulnerability of maritime power to those geographical constraints.
It will become evident that the major constraints relate to
military operations and thus it is assumed that the reader has some
knowledge of such operations. In the exploration of future
alternatives, speculation is inevitable, as the implementation of the
Gorbachev initiatives is itself full of uncertainty.
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BACKGROUND
Recent History (1)
World War II saw the Soviet Navy playing only a supporting
role to the Soviet ground forces and a program of construction of
capital ships, begun in 1938, cancelled in 1940 in favor of re-
equipping the army, re-instituted in 1950 under Stalin, was cut
again in 1953. However, the arrival of Admiral Gorshkov as Navy
Commander in the mid '50's coincided with a change of impetus. In a
period of "cold war", as developing nuclear weapons were given
priority, so also were submarines as the Navy's main striking force,
and the construction of large major surface combatants were seen
for the first time for many years. In the '60's, as nuclear warfare
continued to predominate, Moscow also recognized the need to have
influence in other parts of the world to counter "imperialist
aggression ." A Soviet Third World Diplomacy was introduced which
included the capability to deploy military forces overseas in support
of foreign policy interests. Foreign ports, airfields and other
facilities were developed as the Navy's peacetime tasks were
expanded to include international duty and military support. This
helped to encourage the Soviet Navy to develop from a coastal force
to a true blue-water fleet.
In the mid '70's, the Kremlin changed the long range military
priorities and conventional capability returned to favor as the
offensive arm, behind the shield of nuclear weapons. The submarine
remained the dominant vessel of the Navy and the introduction of the
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) with an extended range
3
missile, capable of operating under ice in the Barents Sea, was to
have a major impact on maritime policy. Up to this time, Gorshkov
appears to have had significant influence, and realizing the need for
aircraft carriers as the indispensable means of gaining sea control
beyond the range of land based aircraft, instituted a carrier building
program. This program was initiated before the arrival of Dmitri
Ustinov and the policy changes of 1976/77, which also saw the first
signs of reduction in power of Gorshkov, at the hands of the new
Minister of Defense.
The '80's saw a cut back in out of ,area activities and exercises
were generally conducted nearer to home. There was a significant
build up of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the SSBN component, and
the development of the Sea of Okhotsk as a safe haven, although
activity continues in the Barents Sea. This reducing activity may be
due to a variety of circumstances and the future is far from clear.
It is likely that the unannounced replacement of Gorshkov in 1985
was partly due to a reassessment of the very expensive carrier
program and partly due to inter-service rivalry, in the fight for the
defense rouble.
Status of the Soviet Navy
When considering Soviet Maritime Power, it is important to
realize that not only is the Navy subordinate to the Army, but
maritime strategy is subordinate to an overall military strategy,
which in turn depends upon national goals. (2) It is thus the army
marshalls and generals who have major influence on the policy
making mechanism. It is therefore likely that the deployment of the
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Soviet Navy will not be a purely naval decision. The Soviets also
believe that in wartime, the co-ordination of all three services is
essential in the geographic theaters of military operations. The
Soviet Fleets will thus be subordinate to a Theater High Command
and the land battle may dictate the employment of certain naval
units.
When considering the missions of the Soviet Navy, it is
therefore necessary to understand the Soviet Union's unified
military policy and the status of the Navy in the decision making
process.
Missions of the Soviet Navy
The missions of the Soviet Navy will dictate the deployment of
the four fleets and thus the geographic constraints that will be
imposed upon them. Policy changes at higher levels will result in
amendments to the many missions that are assigned, both in peace
and in war. For convenience, in the following description, the
current missions are grouped under five headings, which will be
addressed separately: (3)
Deterrence
Defense of the Homeland
Support of Ground Force
Offensive Strike
Protection and Promotion of Soviet Interests
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Deterrence
This activity relates to both peace and war and has two
components. The first is the maintenance of a credible deterrence,
contained in the ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), to guarantee
the technical protection of the primary land based deterrent of the
Strategic Rocket Forces. The SSBNs provide a second strike
capability and act as a strategic reserve . The second component is
the protection of the SSBN Force itself, which is a high priority
mission for the remaining maritime general purpose forces.
In essence, the SSBNs deploy from their bases to areas chosen
to provide safe havens for their patrols, within missile range of the
U.S. The two primary areas are the Barents Sea, in the vicinity and
relative safety of the polar ice cap, and the Sea of Okhotsk, which is
a forbiddingly remote and frequently ice bound area almost entirely
surrounded by Soviet territory. The deployment of the SSBNs would
likely be escorted by other nuclear hunter/killer submarines (SSNs)
and supported by other anti-submarine (ASW) and anti-surface
warfare (ASUW) assets.
Defense of the Homeland
The Navy's role in defense of the homeland related to the
protection against attacks from the sea. Protection is requires from
major amphibious landings, air attacks launched from aircraft
carriers and missile attacks from submarines. The major threat
posed would be U.S. and NATO maritime forces, particularly the U.S.
carrier battle groups (GBG) and SSNs deployed to the Norwegian Sea,
the Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific. The primary means of
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countering such attacks would be by coordinated operations of
nuclear submarines, Soviet Naval Airforce long range aircraft, and
possibly certain missile armed major surface combatants.
Support of Ground Forces
This role has evolved from the earlier major role of the Navy
in support of the army. It now includes conducting amphibious
landings and countering enemy amphibious operations, as well as
providing direct gunfire, missile or air support to ground forces
within range of the coast. A very important mission, included in
this heading, is the interdiction of the Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOCs) of the enemy - such as reinforcement and resupply of
Europe, across the Atlantic, or of U.S. bases, across the Pacific.
Protection of their own SLOGs, the pro-SLOC mission, such as
coastal military supply shipping to their own land forces, is also
included.
To carry out the anti-SLOC mission, the most effective method
would almost certainly be by submarine deployed to attack ocean
going shipping beyond the range of land based ASW Air. The
remaining missions are probably best accomplished by the major
surface units with their guns and missile capabil ities, and
amphibious assets, supported by land-based air .
Offensive Strike
This mission would most likely be executed by the long range
Soviet Naval Airforce (SNAF) bombers and submarines, both using
nuclear weapons. This would be a back-up mission once war had
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escalated to a nuclear phase. Targets would logically include
coastal areas where maritime infrastructure has been developed,
such as major ports and naval bases.
Protection and Promotion of Soviet Interests at Sea
This is the primary peacetime mission of the Soviet Navy and
is concerned with freedom of navigation, security of fishing and
merchant shipping , oceanographic research, exercises and other non-
belligerent activities. Deployment in support of these activities
will vary, but it is apparent that presently assigned missions cannot
be carried out from within the confines of Soviet Territorial Sea,
Internal Waters, and airspace. Yet, to move out of area, the Soviet
Navy makes itself vulnerable to the geographical constraints which
exist both in peace and in war.
GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS
The constraints faced by Soviet Maritime Power have their
cause in geography, but the effects can be experienced in a variety
of ways. To discuss the nature of these constraints, they have been
divided into three categories: physical, political and legal, and
military.
Physical Constraints
The physical constraints refer to those areas wh ich are
restricted by the presence of land masses or straits which influence
the deployment of maritime forces. The width of a strait may
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restrict the ability of a group of ships to maneuver, particularly in a
narrow channel, whilst depth will dictate the size and type of vessel
that may pass through, or indeed prevent submerged submarine
operations. The presence of ice may close areas for part of the year
to surface shipping and tortuous channels and unreliable currents
may significantly restrict navigation or military operations.
Political and Legal Constraints
These constraints relate to the ownership of coastal waters
and adjacent landmass, and the associated legal regime . In wartime,
the necessity to pass close to the territory, or through the waters of
a potential or actual enemy, may seriously affect the decision to
transit through such an area. In peacetime, the major restrictions
are more likely to be associated with the Law of the Sea. As will be
seen later, the deployment of the Soviet Navy is dependent on transit
through several straits which exhibit a diversity in terms of the
legal regime of passage. Although UNCLOS III is as yet unratified
and is primarily concerned with the peaceful use of the sea, the
current treaty is widely accepted as a basis for acceptable
navigational provisions.
One important aspect of passage relates to the difference
between the types of strait. Where a strait is wider than the
combined width of the Territorial Seas on each side, there exists in
the middle a strip of water which is subject to a high seas or EEZ
regime, thus permitting freedom of navigation or overflight. In
straits entirely contained within the Territorial Seas of the two
sides , it becomes a legal strait, in which the regime of transit
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passage is deemed to exist. This permits all ships and aircraft the
right of unimpeded transit passage provided it be "for the purpose of
continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of
the high sea or EEl and another part of the high sea of EEl." (4) This
regime was introduced at UNCLOS III and is quite distinct from
innocent passage, which does not permit overflight and may be
suspended. There is thus some sensitivity on the part of some
maritime nations as to the stability of the transit passage routine.
One exception to the legal regime in straits is contained in
Article 35c of UNCLOS III, which states that transit passage will
not apply where "passage is regulated in whole or in part by long
standing international conventions in force ..... " · In such
circumstances, the strait will be regulated in accordance with the
appropriate convention. Two such straits, the Danish and Turkish
Straits, have direct impact on the Soviet Navy and will be discussed
later. Other legal regimes, such as the continental shelf and EEl,
may also impinge upon the flexibility of Soviet maritime operations,
but it is not intended to cover them within the scope of this paper.
Military Constraints
Military aspects of the geographical constraints relate
primarily to the operation of weapon systems of ships, submarines,
aircraft and other shorebased platforms. Starting beneath the
su rface, a strait or restricted waterway may contain water of
suitable bottom or depth for the effective operation of submarines,
placement of mines, or bottom mounted detection systems; all of
which can present a major threat to the transitter. The submarine
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is generally considered the most effective anti-submarine weapon,
and operations in relatively constrained waters, probably more
familiar to the hunter than to the hunted, gives the former a
significant advantage.
Mines can be a major form of defense, whether rapidly laid in a
period of tension or covertly laid in peacetime. Modern mines can be
activated or de-activated remotely and be monitored to ascertain
the exact status of arming. (5) It is technically feasible to lay an
unarmed harmless field of mines which may be de-activated for a
long period, but when activated remotely , at a chosen time, can
select specific targets . Such a minefield would pose no danger to
navigation and there would be no requirement for the coastal state
to give appropriate publicity, as required by UNCLOS III, until such
time as the field were remotely armed . Conversely, the
announcement of mining itself, whether true or false, may be enough
to inhibit passage through such restricted waters. An excellent
example of the effectiveness of mining can be found in the recent
mining of the Straits of Hormuz by Iranian forces. The presence of a
number of out-of-date and unsophisticated mines led to the
deployment of mine countermeasure forces from five different
nations, and the institution of convoying with close escorts, for U.S.
flagged vessels. The cost of these operations was out of all
proportions to the costs of laying the mines.
The laying of a passive surveillance system can also be done
covertly and with modern technology, it is extremely unlikely that
even a deep transitting submarine would remain undetected. An
example of such a system is the U.S. SOSUS systems, which is
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reported to have the capability of passing detection information
ashore within minutes. (6)
A vessel transitting on the surface is susceptible to attack by
seaborne and shorebased missile systems. Many types of
sophisticated missiles can be purchased on the open market, and the
experience of the Falklands confrontation between the U.K. and
Argentina illustrated the devastating effect of Exocet, which is but
one of a family of short to medium range weapons available. The
submarine or surface transitters may also have to put themselves
within range of landbased air assets which provide another threat
dimension. Thus a coastal state, bordering such a constrained
seaway, may be capable of completely dominating the area with in-
water and airflight weapon systems, delivered from a variety of
different platforms .
On the other hand, some constraints might provide a military
advantage to the transitter. An excellent example would be the
under-ice operations by submarines. Not only will a transitting
submarine be immune from attack by surface vessels and aircraft,
but intelligent use of the inherently noisy conditions in the vicinity
of the ice edge, will significantly improve the the chances of
avoiding detection by passive sonar sensors. Conversely, the quiet
waters under the polar ice cap offer the patrolling submarine an
excellent environment for long range passive detection of the
approach of another submarine. In addition, the physical
characteristics of the ice are such that areas of thin ice, less than
10 inches thick, always exist and can be readily detected; thus
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offering little resistance to a submarine which has a long range
missile firing capability .
Having thus described the general nature of the constraints
which mights inhibit deployment of maritime forces, it is now
intended to consider each Soviet fleet separately. The fleet
composition and relevant geographical constraints will first be
described. This will be followed by an assessment of the effect of
those constraints on the maritime missions in peace and in war.
THE NORTHERN FLEET
Based on the Kola Peninsula, the Northern Fleet has been the
centerpiece of the Soviet Navy since WW II. Its growth and
characteristics reflect the importance the Soviets attach to the
North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, and the Arctic, in their
continental strategy. It is the only fleet with direct access to open
oceans and consists of : (7)
Aircraft Carrier 1
Major Surface Combatants 73
Other Combatants 82
SSBNs 39
Other Submarines 136
Naval Aviation 440
Auxiliaries 95
Naval Infantry 1 Brigade (12,000)
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Constraints:
North Cape - This most northerly point of Norway is only 250 miles
from the Kola and although by no means a strait, it dominates the
deep water transit route of any N. Fleet unit proceeding North West
and West from its home base. It is also an area constantly under
surveillance by NATO forces, making any covert deployment very
difficu It. (8)
Greenlandllceland/U.K. (GIUK) Gap - Although relatively wide:
(Greenland/Iceland 180m; Iceland/UK 400m) and deep:
(Green land/Iceland 1000+ft; Iceland/U K 600-3000ft), th is focal
point is 1500 miles form the Kola and almost entirely dominated by
NATO's military capability . The GIUK Gap is within range of land
base attack air , air defense and ASW aircraft; it is an excellent area
for submarines operating in the anti-submarine role and is
constantly under surveillance by a combination of Long Range
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and SOSUS. (9) The three major passages
through the area also lend themselves to anti-submarine mining
operations although the northerly Denmark Strait has partial ice
cover for much of the year. All nations bordering the Straits are
members of NATO.
Davis Strait - Width: 170m; Depth: 1000+ft; Length: 300m. The
reason for the inclusion of this strait is that it may provide the only
means by which the N. Fleet submarines can transit into the Atlantic
without passing through the GIUK Gap, thus avoiding probable
detection. However, transitters from the Arctic must pass through
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constraints on this primary mission . The one exception is the
Yankee Class SSBN, which although becoming obsolete, still have an
operational capability and must transit through the GIUK Gap in
order to reach the appropriate patrol areas in the mid-Atlantic, from
which their shorter range missiles can be fired at the U.S. mainland.
Defense of the Homeland
The primary threat to the Soviet homeland is the NATO
Striking Fleet Carrier Battle Groups and the U.S . Cruise Missile
Firing Submarines (SSGN) which plan to deploy into the Norwegian
Sea through the GIUK Gap. To oppose these forces, using the
principle of defense in depth, it would be logical to attempt to
counter them before they transit the Gap. This would be achieved by
coordinated long range air and submarine attack, but both types of
asset would themselves have to transit in the vicinity of Norway and
through the GIUK Gap to achieve firing positions.
Support of Ground Forces
The existence of the North Cape and nearby NATO air and naval
bases, is undoubtedly a thorn in the side of the USSR and it is thus
possible that an attempt would be made to neutralize N. Norway.
This might be achieved by air operations or possibly amphibious
operations in support of ground forces. The anti-SLOC component of
the mission however, would likely be carried out by N. Fleet
submarines, which would have to transit long distances into the
Atlantic, through the GIUK Gap, thus making themselves vulnerable
to detection and attack.
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Offensive Strike
The offensive strike mission would most probably be carried
out against land based maritime targets on the coast of Europe or
the U.S. The deployment of long range naval aviation and nuclear
submarines again involves a transit through the unfriendly
environment of tile GIUK Gap, with its associated anti-air and ASW
capability.
THE SALTIC FLEET
With its major base at Leningrad, the Baltic Fleet has several
other lesser bases available in the Baltic Sea. In addition, both the
East German (GDR) and Polish Navies are tightly integrated into the
Soviet operational chain of command in peacetime. They are well
trained and effective navies and of particular significance is their
amphibious and minewarfare capability. In war, all three are
subordinated under one Soviet Commander, with the GDR and Polish
Navies having a major supporting role to the Baltic Fleet. The
composition is: (12)
Baltic Fleet
Major Surface Combatants
Other Combatants
Submarines (SS&SSB)
Naval Aviation
Auxiliaries
Naval Infantry
1 7
50
96
45(includes 6 Glls)
282
45
1 Brigade
GDR Navy
Combatants 133
Auxiliaries 70
Polish Navy
Combatants 125
Submarines 3
Auxiliaries 40
Landing Division 1 (12,000 men)
The majority of the East German and Polish combatants consist of
small fast missile and torpedo boats and minewarfare units, plus a
significant amphibious capability.
Constraints:
Danish Straits - Consist of three passages of approximately 60
miles in length, in a general North/South direction called the Little
Belt, the Great Belt and the Sound (minimum widths: 0.5m, 1.0m, and
2.5m; minimum depths: 45ft, 60ft, and 20ft). The mainland to the
West, and islands forming the land boundaries to both Belts, are
Danish. The Sound is contained by the major Danish island of Zealand
to the West and Sweden to the East. To the North, the straits open
out to the Kattegat, a broad but relatively shallow waterbody,
contained by Denmark and Sweden and leading into the 9reatly deeper
waters of the Skagerrak off the Norwegian Coast.
To the South the Straits lead into the Western Baltic, with the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as the southern landmass. This
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area then rapidly expands eastward into the central Baltic in the
vicinity of the GDR, and is surrounded by Poland, the USSR, Finland,
and Sweden. It can be seen that the countries exercising control
over the Straits are Denmark and West Germany, both members of
NATO, and Sweden which has a long tradition of neutrality.
The Straits are claimed by Denmark and Sweden to be subject
of the Copenhagen Convention of 1857, and as such are not subject to
transit passage, being excepted by Article 35c of UNCLOS III. (13)
Thus both nations have introduced rules relating to the transit of the
Straits, particularly pertaining to warships. The presence of
shallow waters and narrow fairways make the Danish Straits
particularly suitable for mining, and the operation of small fast
patrol craft and shore based missile or gun batteries.
Kiel Canal - This canal , connecting the Western Baltic with the
North Sea, is the only exit for ships in the event of closure of the
Danish Straits. The canal cuts across part of the FRG and is suitable
for shipping up to about 20,000 tons. The control of the waterway
will remain with the power occupying the adjacent land and although
it is available to all nations in peacetime, it could easily be closed
or restricted to certain users in time of war.
Peacetime
In the Danish Straits there are no barriers to merchant
shipping, but certain restrictions exist for warships. The rules
relating to the Swedish part of the Sound permit innocent passage
for all warships and aircraft without notification, and passage for
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belligerents in wartime, with certain restrictions. The Danish rules
are more demanding and relate only to peacetime, giving the Danish
Ministry of Defense the power to make exceptions to the regulations
at any time. In all circumstances, submarines must proceed on the
surface, flying the appropriate national flag, although water depth
provides few opportunities to transit submerged. In peacetime,
three or more warships require notification of at least three days if
passing through the Great Belt or Danish part of the Sound, and
overflight of military aircraft requires permission requests, eight
days in advance. (14) This Danish/Swedish claim is ambiguous and
may be challenged on the basis that the original treaty of 1857 did
not include warships, which had never been restricted prior to this
time. However, NATO nations have not been anxious to challenge
their Danish allies.
Due to the large complex of repair and support 'facilities in the
Baltic, there is a frequent transit of major units coming from and
returning to other fleets, but no protest is made by the Soviet
authorities regarding the regulations. Occasionally, groups of major
Soviet combatants will exit the Baltic to exercise with the N. Fleet,
often simulating enemy forces, but they always return. Polish and
GDR major units seldom leave the Baltic. However, it is clear that
the combined strength of the Baltic Fleet and supporting navies is
greater than that required for coastal defence and thus an offensive
strategy is assumed. (15)
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Wartime
Deterrence and Defense of the Homeland
These are minor missions for the Baltic Fleet. The only units
which contribute to deterrence are the 6 Golf II Class submarines
which have ballistic missiles with a range of approximately 750
miles, and are unlikely to leave the confines of the Baltic. The
domination of the Baltic by Warsaw Pact surface forces , supported
by adjacent land based air, makes a seaborne attack against the
USSR difficult to execute. The only potentially offensive forces in
the Baltic are the coastal submarines and attack-air of the FRG and
Danish naval and airforces, which all have a maritime mission.
Support of Ground Forces
This is the major role of the Baltic Fleet and to carry out such
operations, the missile, gun and air capability could be used to
neutralize much of Denmark's defensive capability. Subsequently,
mine countermeasure and amphibious forces should be employed to
project power ashore with the Soviet Naval Infantry, Polish Landing
Division and airborne assault forces. This would not only be a first
step in controlling the Straits, but would siqniticantly assist
Warsaw Pact land forces by creating a flanking move on NATO's
ground forces on the northern Central Front. Attrition against
Danish air defence forces would reduce the threat to both medium
and long range Soviet naval aviation, thus enabling it to have less
restricted egress from their Baltic bases to the North Sea and
beyond. It is speculated that Sweden would remain neutral, but
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control of the Danish islands and the mainland of Denmark and
Northern FRG would facilitate the desired control of the Straits.
The primary role of NATO forces in the Danish Straits would be
defensive in nature. Both the Danish and FRG forces contain a
significant minelaying capability, which is exercised frequently and
is considered to be extremely effective. The laying of mines in
Danish and FRG Territorial Seas and Internal Waters, should
successfully block the Straits and inhibit Warsaw Pact amphibious
operations, until they can be cleared by the large minesweeper force .
The NATO fast missile craft and air assets would help to defend
against such offensive operations .
The early deployment by parts of the Baltic Fleet prior to
hostilities has been much discussed. (16) However, in the view of
this author, this departure is unlikely, as it is not compatible with
the major Soviet aim to exercise control over the entire Baltic Sea.
Thus it can be seen that the Danish Straits play a crucial part
in any future conflict. The need to control these waters is
recognized by both sides and the inherent penalty of losing control is
unacceptable to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
THE BLACK SEA FLEET
Based upon Sevastopol, although the Black Sea is almost
totally enclosed, the Fleet is large and very significant shipbuilding
and repair facilities exist. This Fleet also provides the permanent
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which consists of approximately 40
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combatants and auxiliaries. The Fleet dominates the Black Sea and
consists of: .
Aircraft Carriers 2
Major Surface Combatants 73
Other Combatants 70
Submarines 29
Naval Aviation 468
Auxiliaries 63
Naval Infantry 1 Brigade
Co nstraints:
The Turkish Straits are the only exit from the Black Sea and
consist of the Bosphorus (min. width : 0.45m; min. depth: 108ft;
length: 17m) and the Dardenelles (min.width:0.6m; min. depth:
165+ft; length: 35m). These two narrow straits are connected by the
Sea of Marmara, itself approximately 100 miles long and the entire
length of the waterway is contained within Turkish territory. The
Straits are subject to the legal regime of the Montreux Convention
and again comes under the Article 35c exemptions of UNCLOS III.
Small craft and mining operations are likely to be effective in these
restricted waters; a capability held by the Turkish Navy.
Strait of Gibraltar - This strait is included as the legal regime of
the Turkish Straits does not permit the transit of submarines from
the Black Sea, to operate in the Mediterranean. Thus the Northern
Fleet provides the submarine support for the Soviet Med. Squadron
(typically 7-8 SS/SSN); which must transit through this waterway.
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Although strong currents in the narrowest part of the Strait (width:
8m; depth: 1000+ft; length: 33m), make mining difficult, the areas
on either side are suitable, as well as providing relatively good
conditions for ASW Operations.
Peacetime
The Montreux Convention of 1936 provides for free passage of
merchant vessels of all nations, but sets a number of conditions for
the passage of warships, differentiating between Black Sea and non-
Black Sea Powers. The regulations dictate the size, type, and
number of foreign vessels that may transit at the same time,
specifying the notification required and maximum aggregate tonnage
and length of time a non-Black Sea nation's warship may stay. (17)
These regulations thus have the effect of dictating the composition
of the Med. Squadron, as well as raising questions as to the legality
of large warship transits. Of particular interest to NATO will be the
assumed forthcoming exit of the first Soviet nuclear powered
aircraft carrier, recently completed in a Black Sea yard. On the
other hand, the legal regime might be seen by the Soviets as
assisting in the aim of restricting the entry of non-Black Sea
nations, thus supporting the concept of an enclosed sea, which is in
their own interest.
24
Wartime
Defense of the Homeland
Similar to the Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet does not have a
serious deterrence capability, but the defense of the homeland
mission is very real. This is due to the presence of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean, capable of conventional and nuclear
strike operations against Soviet territory. To counter this threat, a
coordinated attack would likely be planned, composed of long range
naval aviation from their bases in the Crimea, submarines and
surface forces from the Soviet Med. Squadron.
Support of Ground Forces
Units remaining within the Black Sea, under the control of the
South West District Theater Commander, would initially support
ground forces with defensive operations along the coast. Offensive
amphibious operations in support of a ground and air offensive would
be conducted, aimed at securing the Turkish Straits, as part of a
campaign to neutralize Turkey, Greece, and Italy; in order to ensure
control of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean . This in turn
would permit access to the Med. for Black Sea Fleet submarines and
thus provide additional assets to interdict the significant NATO
SLOCs in the Western Mediterranean.
In addition to the Sixth Fleet, the size of which might vary
sign ificantly, the remaining threat to the projection of maritime
power in the area, is likely to be the Turkish forces, cast in a
defensive role. The Turkish Navy is relatively small, consisting
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primarily of submarines and small missile craft in the area of the
Black Sea and Straits . These would be supported by defensive
mining and land based air assets. The Turkish Army is of
considerable size, and reinforced by other planned NATO forces,
could present a formidable obstacle to would be aggression, along
with the Turkish Straits.
THE PACIFIC FLEET
With the major base at Vladivostok and a submarine base at
Petropavlovsk, the Pacific Fleet is now the largest, having doubled
in size since 1965. The most recently completed aircraft carrier
has joined this Fleet, making it the only one with two carriers. In
1988 the Fleet consisted of:
Aircraft Carriers 2
Major Surface Combatants 75
Other Combatants 128
SSBNs 30
Other Submarines 98
Naval Aviation 560
Auxiliaries 95
Naval Infantry 1 Brigade
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Co nstraints:
The major operating areas for the Pacific Fleet are in the Sea
of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Restricting access between the
two seas, as well as East to the Pacific and South to the Yellow Sea,
are three principle international straits: Korea, Tsugaru, and La
Perouse.
Korea Straits are composed of two parts. The West Korea Strait is
between South Korea and the Japanese island of Tsushima (width:
22m; min. depth: 165+ft; length: 41m). The East Korea Strait lies
between Tsushima and the Japanese mainland (width: 25m; depth:
165+ft; length: 12m). These straits sit astride the major trade
route to and from the West Coast of Japan and the East Coast of the
Soviet Union. Through them run the essential shipping lifelines from
Singapore, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, on which Japan is
so dependent. The area is suitable for submarine and mining
operations .
Tsugaru Strait - Separating the two main Japanese islands of
Hokkaido and Honshu, this strait forms a major artery between them,
including the newly built Seikan Tunnel which runs beneath. It is
also the shortest route from the central Sea of Japan to the Pacific
and is ice-free throughout the year. It lends itself readily to control
by Japan from ashore and the waters are suitable for mining and
passive sensors. Although less than 24 miles in width, (min. width :
10m; depth: 350-600ft; length: 60m) Japan only claims a 3 mile
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Territorial Sea through these Straits and thus creates an EEZ or high
seas passage.
La Perouse (Soya) Strait - Situated between Northern Japan and the
Soviet territory of Sakhalin, the strait forms a major SLOC between
the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk (width: 21 m; depth: 600ft; length: 6m).
The Strait is suitable for mining or submarine operations, although
it is frozen over for several months in the Winter. This is the only
one of the three straits over which the Soviets have part ownership
and thus plays an important part in their maritime strategy.
Wartime
Deterrence
It is understood that the Pacific Fleet SSBNs will deploy from
their base at Petropavlovsk, accompanied by supporting SSNs, into
the relative sanctuary of the Sea of Okhotsk. However, the
remoteness of this base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, with no road or
rail links with the rest of the Soviet Union, depends upon the sea for
resupply, thus creating an essential SLOC from Vladivostok which
would normally pass through La Perouse Strait. Control of this
Strait, or an alternative ice-free route, is likely to become part of a
successful deterrent mission. As with the Northern Fleet, the
Yankee class submarine becomes an exception, and would need to
transit East if wishing to achieve a missile firing position within
range of the U.S.
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Defense of the Homeland
The major threat to the USSR in the Far East is the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, which has the capability to launch stand-off carrier-borne air
attacks or submarine launched cruise missiles. To oppose that
threat, it would be logical to attack U.S. units at long range to
prevent them entering the Seas of Japan or Okhotsk, although with
forward U.S. bases in Japan, this may not be easy to achieve.
However, the best strategy would seem to be a coordinated attack by
long range naval aviation, submarines, and possibly major surface
units, in the Pacific approaches to the Kuriles and the Sea of Japan.
Once again, the ability to transit the straits will be critical.
Support of Land Forces
It is difficult to speculate on a land battle in the Far East, but
it is believed that the Soviets must consider the need to ensure
some form of control over the straits. The significant mining and
amphibious capability of the Pacific Fleet could be employed, and all
straits are within range of naval aviation assets. La Perouse would
certainly be the easiest to control, by landings on Northern Hokkaido,
supported from the base already established at Korsakov , on the
southern tip of Sakhalin. (18)
Tsuguru and the Korea Straits, being bounded by the non-
'friendly nations of Japan and Korea, are unlikely to be amphibious
targets in the early stages of a war. It must also be remembered
that the U.S. Pacific Fleet has a greater capability than its Soviet
counterpart and is likely to act as a significant deterrent to
extended range amphibious operations . Thus again, it would be
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offensive mining and submarine operations that would play a vital
part in the battle for control of these straits.
SLOC interdiction in the Pacific theater is meaningful to both
the Soviets and their opponents. Although much U.S. forward basing
has taken place in Guam, Japan, and the Philippines, important and
lengthy SLOCs from the U.S. will still exist, as well as Japan's own
essential SLOCs to the South and East. These will be vulnerable to
the Fleet's large submarine force, deployed from Vladivostok,
perhaps through the straits, or from Petropavlovsk.
On the other hand, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is itself heavily
dependent on SLOCs, as a substantial percentage of its supplies
come by sea from the Western Soviet Union through Suez , or via the
Cape of Good Hope or North East Passage. The development of the
Soviet military base at Cam Ranh Bay, in Vietnam, has created
another SLOC which needs protection. Thus it can be seen that
SLOCs in this theater are vital to both sides.
Offensive Strikes
Offensive strikes by long range naval aviation, submarines, and
surface forces against Japan , can be conducted 'from within the Sea
of Japan. However, similar such strikes against U.S. bases beyond
the perimeter of Japan , involves the transit of at least one of the
straits.
The military importance of these three straits is clearly
evident. If the Soviets wish to dominate the Seas of Japan and
Okhotsk, it is in their interest to control the Straits or deny control
to a potential enemy.
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ALTERNATIVES
It is apparent that Soviet Maritime Power is severely
restricted by the geographical constraints which must be faced by
all four fleets. In peacetime the constraints are predominantly
physical and legal and are of lesser significance. But in wartime,
the imposition of political and military constraints have an
overwhelming impact on the traditional flexibility of seapower. In
the final part of the paper, four alternatives will be explored, which
could reduce the vulnerability of Soviet Maritime Power to these
constraints.
Overseas Bases
The acquisition of overseas bases can reduce dependence upon
the need to transit straits and other focal points. At present, as an
aid to foreign policy , the USSR has obtained basing rights in:
Vietnam, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent, Libya,
Angola, and Cuba. However, these bases are generally found in poorly
developed countries which have limited capacity for ship repair and
most of these nations do not have strong traditional ties with the
Soviet Union. In addition, past experience such as the loss of
Alexandria (Egypt) and Berbera (Somalia) as bases, indicates a lack
of guarantee of return on the investment. Another major
disadvantage is the fact that oversea bases create their own SLOCs,
which could themselves become vulnerable.
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Offensive Operations
The second alternative is to carry out offensive operation
prior to or early in a confrontation, in order to overcome or
neutralize the geographical constraints. Although certain straits
might be dominated by military forces from a distance, in order to
control such straits it will normally be necessary to carry out
amphibious or land operations in order to hold adjacent territory. As
only one of the six straits considered earlier involves shared
ownership by the USSR (La Perouse), such operations against enemy
held territory would likely only be considered as part of a major, and
costly, campaign. Where such straits are not immediately adjacent
to the landmass of the USSR, additional SLOGs would again be
created. It is thus probable that such an option would only be
considered where it was thought to directly support the land battle ,
as in the case of the Baltic and Black Sea.
Defensive Operations
This alternative is seen as the ability to influence the military
activity within a constrained area, without having to be established
on the adjacent land. An example would be the denial of access to a
strait, perhaps by the presence of mines, submarines or acoustic
surveillance systems creating an unacceptable transit risk , thus
effectively using the strait to own advantage.
The early deployment of mines and submarines by the Northern
Fleet in the GIUK Gap could be described as defensive operations, as
could similar operations in the straits surrounding the Sea of Japan,
discussed earlier. However, an important principle is involved: if
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you wait too long your opponent might be there before you, which
makes control of such an area much more difficult. On the other
hand, if you get there too early you might be giving your opponent
warning of your intentions, thus perhaps losing the essential
element of surprise.
Change of Policy
A positive alternative would be a change of policy which would
have the result of diminishing the Soviet Navy's dependence upon
access to the oceans. It is believed that such a change could be
taking place, although the inherent reasons and the future outcome
are far from clear. Indications come from the reduction of out of
area deployments witnessed in the last few years. (19) 1987 saw
the withdrawal of the Yankee class submarines from the mid-
Atlantic and was the first year for over a decade that did not see the
deployment of a Soviet Task Force to the Caribbean. Major out of
area exercises have been less extensive and it does appear that the
Soviet "bastion" theory of defense has regained official
respectability. (20)
At the same time, the world is going through a remarkably
peaceful period. The superpowers are talking disarmament, the Gulf
war is at an end, the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, and
'perestroika" appears to be having a liberating effect on Eastern
Europe. For the USSR, there is no doubt that defense spending must
be reduced if an economic future is to be assured. In evidence of
this trend, over the past decade the growth rate of defense spending
has declined from 4% to 2% per annum. (21) Even the military
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leaders appear to support Gorbachev's economic reforms, and indeed
seem more enthusiastic than many of the Party managers. (22)
There has been a general slowing down by the Politburo on military
procurement, as perhaps evidenced by the reduction in the aircraft
carrier program, which now appears significantly less ambitious .
(23)
So far , the USSR has based its superpower status largely upon
its military capability. To retain that status it must match the
West economically, technically, and ideologically; which it has
failed to do in the past. The present initiative by Gorbachev is based
upon an acknowledgement of this weakness and might be leading to
the change in policy that will in turn affect maritime power.
Perhaps that change has recognized a lessening of tension and need
to reduce the expensive out of area activity, indicating a return to a
more defensive posture by the Soviet Navy, nearer to the homeland.
The primary mission fo deterrence would be unaffected by such a
move, as the SSBNs have already adjusted their patrol positions to
areas relatively close to their operational bases
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CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet Navy is the tool of Soviet Maritime Power and
deployments will depend upon the overall military strategy, based on
national policy. A review of current missions of tile four Fleets,
identifies a significant need for deployment of assets distant from
the homeland. Such deployments are faced with constraints created
by geography, whether physical, political and legal, or military in
nature. In turn , these constraints are seen to have a potentially
adverse impact upon the accomplishment of the maritime missions.
Alternatives are required to reduce the vu Inerability of the
Soviet Navy to those constraints; four have been explored. The
preferable option would appear to be a change in Soviet policy. The
recent reduction in maritime deployments and level of activity
indicates that a change in policy may be taking place. It is possible
that the reason for change was initiated by the restructuring, or
"perestroika", introduced in the recent past by Mikhail Gorbachev.
Conversely, the reason for the change in policy could be the
very existence of those geographical constraints , which when
viewed in conjunction with the formidable capability of a 600 ship
U.S . Navy and allied forces, simply present too great a challenge;
only to be overcome by imposing an unacceptable economic burden on
the Soviet people.
In reality, it is probably a combination of these reasons which
are dictating a change in policy and any future turn of events is not
easy to predict. But, for the foreseeable future, it is clear that the
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Soviet fleets will remain aware of the geographical constraints to
their projection of maritime power.
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NOTES
(1) George J.L. Ed. The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View
from the mid-1980s. Naval Institute Press p9.
(2) Ibid p84.
(3) Ibid p27, based on article by Herrick, R.W.
(4) Alexander, L.M . Navigational Restrictions within New LOS Context
for more comprehensive coverage pp 104-108.
(5) Thorpe, A.Y. Minewarfare at Sea. 18 ODIL 2, p264.
(6) Larson, D.L. Naval Weaponry and LOW 18 ODIL 2, p.153
(7) All Fleet compositions extracted from: Soviet Military Power
1988, Government Printing Office.
(8) As for (6) p150.
(9) Ibid p.155
(10) Le Marchant, T. Captain R.N., Under Ice Operations, Naval War
College Review Jan/Feb 1985
(11) As for (1) p203
(12) As for (1) p297 -for 'fuller description of WP Navies.
(13) See Baltic Straits orientation map at end.
(14) Alexandersson, G. The Baltic Straits, International Straits of
the World Vo1.6, Appendices I and II.
(15) Wegener, E. The Soviet Naval Offensive, p35
(16) Ibid p35
(17) As per (4) p140
(18) As for (1) p241
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(19) Editorial to Janes Fighting Ships 1987-88.
(20) Ibid.
(21) The Military Balance 1988, IISS.
(22) Zamascikov S. -Gorbachev and the Soviet Military, Comparative
Strategy Vo!.7, p246
(23) As for (19) .
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FIGURE: Soviet naval fleet areas and ocean access points
Source: Naval War College Review, September 1980.
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